According Soliman Santos, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are commonly implemented for the post-conflict disposition of the forces and weapons of non-state armed groups—particularly rebel or insurgent groups, though they can include excess state forces, especially post-conflict—usually as a result of a final peace agreement embodying a negotiated political settlement. These terms may seem self-explanatory, especially to those familiar with the post-conflict field. But interpretations can vary, particularly from the rebel perspective. The literature on the subject treats DDR as a cluster of activities conventionally associated both with internal peace processes and with international peacekeeping operations. Disarmament refers to the collection and disposal of small arms and light and heavy weapons, both from combatants and civilians, within a conflict or post-conflict zone.1 Disarmament should also include stockpile management.2 Demobilization refers to the process by which armed groups disband their military structures and their combatants begin a transformation into civilian life. They are sometimes recruited or integrated into existing or new unified state military or police forces. Reintegration refers to the adaptation of ex-combatants and sometimes their families or dependants to productive civilian life. The DDR is ‘not (or at least should not be conceived as) a substitute for political solutions’. Rather, it is essentially a post-conflict confidence-building measure; a security component that allows the development component of the peace agreement to proceed on the ground. ‘Though DDR can contribute to development, it is not a development intervention. Nor is social and economic development a sufficient substitute for DDR’ (http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:BrW4FCNcwEMJ:kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/115760/ichaptersection_singledocument/e39e260c-c5b6-4ae5-9b65-73dba6f634ab/en/chapter%2B6.pdf+DDR+of+rebels+by+Soliman+Santos&hl=en&gl=ph&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShGTA590XrO3bHt1OV8DLedLWS5OcSPk2Vr4hmqTeAtOr57Smqd66o9j22udTcU-00yal1DNNHn4f_Npl0wAgiUkeHlYEQwfwReOlRRBpWIadKEMhnj0vn2lJ6YHrZKcMd6G1b4&sig=AHIEtbRXIZHTncEYai3Gxhtec0j4rBKzgw).
The government cannot prove that those who benefited from their Balik-Loob Program their lives are better as compared with ordinary toiling masses. In general, 70% of the livelihood projects under Balik-Loob Program of the government are bankrupt and the remaining 30% is in its way to ruin. The government has still unsettled financial obligations to former rebels like the MNLF, LCM/NPA, Military Rebels, MILF, Misuari Breakaway Group amounting to P125, 888,080.00 in 1994-20005.
What is wrong with the DDR program of OPAPP? First, all government Presidential Advisers for Peace Process including Sec. Deles wants to short-cut the process by demanding for DDR from rebel groups without satisfactorily delivering first the confidence-building aspects of peace talks and lastly, they all substituted political settlement with DDR and with all of these, makes the peace program of the government a failure.